The one-to-one app


How a person drowding in rules can flag them…

…with granular level detail.

Regardless of their party, in the US Congress, senators and congressional representatives employ constituency services personnel whose job is to cut through red tape. In addition to the specific issue, this is a way in which the elected officials can monitor the performance of the public servants who are supposed to be serving the people without the filter of the vested interest of those public service senior management.

In New Zealand, the public service has become opaque, erecting information walls to make this difficult. The various departments, ministries and agencies do not want their activities to be seen so they use standing orders, privacy claims and confidentiality to mask private agendas, incompetence and pecuniary interest.

When they make regulations, how it will impact the regulated person is not part of their concern. They do not connect the regulations they make with the problems facing the nation – such as the affordable housing crisis, or the drop in literacy. The checks and balances that would expose these failings are blocked by the rules.

Techniology makes constituency services easier to run than back in the days of letters and postal delivery.

It requires an online web site in which a set of questions help focus the complaint, and the issue is then fleshed out to not only see the specific concern, but the larger impact. This should be run by the political party or the office of the MP. For list MP’s, the CS should have a nationwide focus. For elected MP’s, their constituency.

It is recommended the party establish a group of peer review volunteers who rank the quality of the complaint. In part this is to filter out the usual cranks who become chronic complainers.

Then, within the party office, examine the complaints to determine which ones can become the triggger for a petition, and also which ones can be consolidated into a press release and news story. 

Game Changer

CHANGE.ORG

 

Change.Org is a two-way petition system

  • Select a topic:  Before selecting it, ensure the outcome will be delivered
  • Independence: The person hosting the petition is not a member or official
  • Communication: The host can send out one email every 24 hours to petitioners
  • Delivery: Four months before the next election, remind the petitioners

Opaque government has developed rules on the content of a petition presented to Parliament, effectively rendering them effete. The petitioners are thanked, the petition is recorded, and in most cases nothing happens.


Technology has changed the power of petitions, primarily because they are not controlled by opaque government, and because they are two-way tools… many-to-one , followed by one-to-many.

In addition to the email link, petitioners can write comments, and these often prove the most useful, especially in debate or confronting bureaucrats.

The power of a two-way petition

Traditionally, petitions were one-way, and indeed, Parliamentary petitions still are. With Change.Org (and possibly other similar apps), the petitioner not only provides their name and address, but their email address. The email address is not downloaded to the host of the petition, but the host is permitted to send out one bulk email every 24 hours to everyone who signed the petition until the host declares victory, after which the petition is closed.

The political secret is not to hit the “declare victory” button that closes the petition. Instead, keep the petitioners informed, especially when victory is achieved, but don’t overdo it. People have busy lives and don’t need fluff emails cluttering up their inbox. Then 4 to 5 months before the election the host sends out a few emails reminding the petitioners which elected official and party delivered, and why it will be important to keep those elected persons in office to protect the reform.

It is better if the host is a trusted person, but not formally affiliated with the politician or the party. This enables the host to maintain control over the petition, giving a hostile media one less target.

Most important is to never promote a petition where the officials will not deliver. Once the regulation has been targeted, the elected official must ensure they have the power to meet the concerns addressed in the petition and to word the petition accordingly. In other words, shoot an arrow at the barn wall and then draw the target around it.

 

Writing regulations on how to write regulations

Returning Effective Power to the Citizenry

Something has gone terribly wrong in New Zealand. The practical Kiwi-can-do attitude that got things done seems to be dying. Getting anything done has become encumbered to the point where the social fabric is breaking down. As one examines what’s changed, it becomes clear it is the culture of government. Where once the elected representatives represented their constituents, walls have been built between the people and the system that governs.

The balance of power is skewed toward the ministries and the PM and Cabinet, where the democratic principle of elected officials voting their electorate is lost. To restore the balance of power, rules on voting instruction need to be changed, and the electorate MP’s and Ministers need their own staff of well-informed researchers to give them an independent assessment of the information provided (or not) by the Ministries and government agencies to the MPs and Ministers.


End party whip telling Electorate MPs how to vote

 

Change: Prohibit party line voting by Electorate MP’s; only permit party votes by List MPs

Why: As demonstrated by the first MMP government where one party held majority power, the PM and an inner circle of senior MP’s undermined the fundamental principles of democracy. The voters elect electorate representatives to speak for them, not for a political party. When they give a party vote, they are supporting the party platform.

What this policy will do: It limits the power of the party whips. The electorate MP’s will take their direction from their electorate, not the party. As members of a party, electorate MP’s can be expected to have a particular affiliation, but as representatives of the people, they cannot be told how to vote by the party.


Independent MP Researchers

 

Change: Fund three Office of MP researchers for each electorate and ministerial office

Why: To become an electorate MP one must win a vote of the people. To become a list MP, one must rise through the party ranks. Neither requires skills in understanding what law and rule making is about, and too many MP’s find they rely on the government agencies – the ministries – for advice. Unfortunately, such agencies have their own internal interests that are not necessarily aligned with the public interest. For MPs to remain informed, they require independent advice under their sole control. Not control as a party, but for each electorate or ministry.

What this policy will do: Each electorate and ministry is funded to employ three law & rule researchers. These researchers would have no political alignment, and would generally be expected to be inherited by the subsequent electorate MP or Minister, regardless of party, although they would serve at the pleasure of said MP and tender their resignation at each election. Their job is to learn and inform their MP as to the detailed workings of the government agencies that impact MP their role (electoral district or Ministry) independent of the information supplied directly by the agency. In effect, the researchers become a form of checks and balances with full right of enquiry into any matter within the Executive branch of government – with no impediments of privacy, state secret (with some limits on overseas-intelligence information) or commercial sensitivity.


Citizen Advocate Services for Electorate MP’s

 

Change: Each electorate MP has 3 funded citizen-services staffers with right of enquiry into any agency

Why: Accountability has broken down. Government agencies use privacy as a shield to avoid accountability. They limit contact with the public to telephone numbers with long holding time, answered by uninformed staffers reading from the same web pages available to the public. Decision-making is anonymous and unaccountable.

What this policy will do: Citizen Advocate Services (CAS) would fund three “fair go” type staffers to cut through the agency barriers. One of the staffers should be a practicing lawyer, qualified to bring legal action to require agency compliance without delay. CAS would have full enquiry authority, not put off by claims of privacy, commercial sensitivity or other barriers. Agency personnel or contractors who obfuscate or obstruct would be subject to negative reports on their personnel file that would be included in promotion, demotion or termination reviews.

The Shield of Privacy and Commercial Sensitivity

Increasingly, accountability requests for information directed to central and local government agencies are deflected with claims of privacy and commercial sensitivity. While government officials have a personal right to not become the subject of public scrutiny, their roles should not be able to use privacy to avoid accountability for their action or inaction), errors and omissions, misuse and abuse of their powers.

Further, in contracts with the private sector, too often claims of commercial sensitivity are used as shields to block legitimate public criticism. In contrast, in many local governments in the United States for example, private sector tenders for government contracts – including sales presentations – are open to the public and often read/attended by competing vendors. The presenting vendor hates it, but the upshot is their competition improving their product or service to win the next contract, thus the people get more bang for their buck. Everyone adjusts to the new open-reality, and quality of life improves for all as a result.

NZ’s laws which obscure public transparency must be replaced to ensure the public knows what its public servants are doing behind closed doors.


Drastically cut privacy & commercial sensitivity

 

Change: Open almost all government functions to public view, available without censorship, omission or obfuscation – and do so using government web pages open to everyone.

Why: Transparency is uncomfortable for anyone except the most outstanding performers. But discomfort is what brings about improvement. A transparent government becomes the focus of what is called crowd-sourcing, where private citizens become unpaid researchers focusing on inefficiency, waste or even wilful corruption. They do for free what media used to do when advertising in newspapers supported independent investigative journalists.

What this policy will do: The privacy laws will be amended to greatly restrict invoking them in public matters. Further, penalties for obfuscation, obstruction or delay will become personnel offenses that go on the personnel file and may result in penalties, demotion or dismissal. Privacy may protect a person’s name, where it is clear they may be unfairly targeted, but never their office. Most tenders and contracts with the private sector will be published online and all presentations captured in video and posted online. Government accounting will be published online, down to the transaction level, where a claim of privacy will require the same legal process as procuring a search warrant – permission of the court.

Regulation and Associated Costs

The cost of compliance with laws and regulations is becoming onerous; to the point where it is polarising NZ into a comfortable class who dislikes the cost of compliance but can afford it, and a struggling class who finds they are locked out of an adequate standard of living due to the excessive rules and regulations.


Tax versus User Pays

Problem: In democracies, people pay tax because they value certain services that benefit the public good. However, over time, the State begins to see taxes as its right, as the obligation of the people without accountability for how well those taxes are invested in the public good. More recently, the neo-liberal concept of User Pays appeals to elected officials because it takes some public services off the books.

The checks and balances of elected officials protecting the people’s money is lost as User Pays uses divide and conquer tactics where individuals face demands rather than the taxpayers as a whole. User Pays creates a monopoly lacking any effective checks on agency dictates.

Demands for fees, charges, contributions and levies are passed on to individuals, and in projects with fixed budgets, the government cut comes first, meaning the money needed for the applicant’s project is reduced, or in many cases, those costs are passed on to the final customer in the form of higher prices where it becomes a de facto tax. This has now  become such a problem that public interest is damaged. For example, affordable housing has been regulated to the point where housing is no longer affordable by 90% of prospective first home buyers and 77% of Kiwis agree home ownership in New Zealand is financially out of reach.

Change: Significantly cut back on User Pays as a revenue source for central and local government. User pays fees must be clearly shown to benefit the applicant. 

This change is proposed as part of the Citizen Advocate Services (CAS) described above. On its own initiative, or through citizen-request, CAS may demand a fiscal impact report of any User Pays. CAS may demand a change to the charge (including requirements for private consultants)  to  require the public benefit is paid by the taxpayer through agency funding.  Fiscal impact includes not only charges by the agency and requirements for costly consultants, but also the cost of time and the cost of distracting the people from their work. Time and stress is as much a “tax” as fees, charges, levies, fines and 3rd party charges.

What this policy will do: On a real-time basis as the people encounter regulatory costs that are alleged to benefit the pecuniary interest of the person (user pays) but the person feels part or all of the benefit is in the public interest, said person may complain to any MP’s CAS (typically their electorate MP or the respective minister), and the CAS must investigate, and if it finds the complaint to have merit, to order the costs be properly apportioned. The agency may appeal the decision to the district or high court, but the respondent will be the office of the MP, not the complainant.


Redefine how public risk is covered

 

Problem: One of the adverse effects of the leaking home crisis was the determination that as the sole remaining party, under the principle of joint and several liability, territorial authorities were found to be liable for billions of dollars in damages caused by rotting buildings. In response, local governments radically increased the cost of building consents, demanding extreme detail with every risk covered by consultant reports.

This especially is the case where the agency (including local government) perceives a liability risk in making a decision. To reduce their risk, they require consultant documentation that is paid by the applicant. With no cost control, these fees, charges, contributions and levies are passed on to the public, where it becomes a de facto tax. This has now  become such a problem that public interest is damaged. For example, affordable housing has been regulated to the point where housing is no longer affordable by 90% of prospective first home buyers and 77% of Kiwis agree home ownership in New Zealand is financially out of reach.

Change: Significantly cut back on User Pays as a revenue source for central and local government. User pays fees must be clearly shown to benefit the applicant. 

This change is proposed as part of the Citizen Advocate Services (CAS) described above. On its own initiative, or through citizen-request, CAS may demand a fiscal impact report of any User Pays. CAS may demand a change to the charge (including requirements for private consultants)  to  require the public benefit is paid by the taxpayer through agency funding.  Fiscal impact includes not only charges by the agency and requirements for costly consultants, but also the cost of time and the cost of distracting the people from their work. Time and stress is as much a “tax” as fees, charges, levies, fines and 3rd party charges.

What this policy will do: On a real-time basis as the people encounter regulatory costs that are alleged to benefit the pecuniary interest of the person (user pays) but the person feels part or all of the benefit is in the public interest, said person may complain to any MP’s CAS (typically their electorate MP or the respective minister), and the CAS must investigate, and if it finds the complaint to have merit, to order the costs be properly apportioned.


Fiscal Impact of Regulation

 

Problem: Regulation is out of control. Rules are made in Wellington with no consideration of the cost, time and hassle that accompany them. The feedback loops that would make regulators aware – if they cared – do not exist. Consultation rarely reaches, must less listens to, the ordinary person impacted by proposed rules. The upshot is making life unaffordable for the majority of Kiwis.

Root causes: At one time, government presumed personal responsibility and regulation existed to control greed, ignorance and mistakes. In the past two decades, primarily in the name of health & safety, regulations have taken on a life of their own. 

Regulations can becomes a de facto tax on the public, to such a scale the public interest is damaged. For example, affordable housing has been regulated to the point where housing is no longer affordable by 90% of prospective first home buyers and 77% of Kiwis agree home ownership in New Zealand is financially out of reach.

Change: On its own initiative, or through citizen-request, CAS may demand a fiscal impact report of any new regulation, at any time, including long after the regulation was put into effect when the public becomes aware of the costs. CAS may demand a change to the regulation to lower the fiscal impact, or require the cost is paid by the taxpayer through agency funding, not as user pays unless it can clearly be shown the pecuniary interest is apportioned its respective costs, and the public interest is paid by the public. “Fiscal” includes not only charges by the agency and requirements for costly consultants, but also the cost of time and the cost of distracting the people from their work. Time and stress is as much a “tax” as fees, charges, levies, fines and 3rd party charges

What this policy will do: All regulations must be subject to a validation test and if they fail, are to be eliminated and replaced by valid regulation. The terms health & safety will have precise meanings and require the regulation is written in a way that impacts the bad actors, but does not interfere with the rest of the affected people.

The Public Service

The pubic service has grown in size and at the same time is closing itself off from the people it ostensibly services. Far too many public servants – rebranded as officers, team leaders and senior managers – now take a degree in public service, then build a lifetime career within government, having no real-world experience in the industries they regulate. They have no understanding of the impact of their output on the regulated. Further, they are not held accountable for their errors, omissions or failures, and as their LinkedIn profiles show, they move from one government job to another. This needs to be changed.


Agency Personnel Sabbaticals

 

Problem: When agency personnel lack “real-world” experience, and are cocooned in a silo culture reinforced by their peers but isolated from public feedback and blowback, they make decisions that adversely impact the people. With the agency-made cultural insulation, they feel no pressure to inform themselves to make good decisions, but instead dig in and use the protections and resources of their agency to frustrate the people.

Need: The policy on fiscal impact addresses the situational matters, but the deeper problem is wilful ignorance. Learning is the cure for ignorance, and it comes through exposure to the persons affected by the agency’s acts (or non-action). The silo protections must be broken down, and this begins with exposing the personnel to the impact of their acts. This is not done by classes or seminars, but by sabbaticals, paid by government, in the field. 

What this policy will do: For two months before starting any public service job that has any impact on the public, and one month every second year, the public servant shall be paid to take a sabbatical and work in the sector that is impacted by the acts of their department/team within the agency. The CAS will organise the sabbaticals, and if the volume is too great, additional CAS staff funding shall be provided to MPs to manage such citizen-services.


Personnel Accountability

 

Problem: Agency personnel are not personally accountable for errors, omissions, failures, fiscal blowout, bad  policy, bad planning, bad execution, bad management, waste, inefficiency or bad performance, except in personal matters (e.g bullying, sexual misconduct, etc.). In some cases, as can be seen on their Linked-In profiles, they move to a new job in another agency of government. There are no rewards for risk taking, and no penalties for failure.

Transparency: The internet makes public disclosure of all acts far simpler.  Require each agency to post its performance in detail so members of the public may analyse and identify the many ways agencies fail to deliver best practice with maximum value in terms of time, money and stress, including identifying the job titles responsible for the failures.

This will require significant change to privacy, commercial sensitivity and personnel accountability policies. 

What this policy will do:

Open Information: Eliminate commercial sensitivity. If a business wishes to do business with the government, it must be prepared to fully disclose the contracts, and all payments available on line. Eliminate privacy as a shield for withholding information. For an agency to claim withholding, it must appeal to the court and pay both its own costs (out of its budget) and those of the people challenging such withholding. Open information is essential for the people to root out bad agency performance

Accountability: When bad performance is discovered, the CAS shall take up the case and identify the responsible personnel. Such findings shall go on the personnel employment record, and shall be considered for all personnel reviews, including salary, promotion, demotion and termination. The record shall be cross-agency so any person applying for any government job shall have their full record, including adverse performance findings, considered for any position funded directly or indirectly by the people.

Elections, Money and Influence

People do not contribute large amounts of money to political campaigns because they love democracy. They expect a quid-pro-quo. Perhaps the most extreme example of this is political campaigns in the USA where it never stops. It is expected of a member of Congress to spend half their time – 4 hours a day or more – raising money for their next campaign. This has not been the case in NZ, but it is increasing. This needs to be changed and with technology its easier to change.


Electoral Reform

 

Problem: Money buys influence. This creates inequity in government as pecuniary interest trumps public interest

Need: Tax-paid elections – A law on election reform would establish the channels through which all candidates make their pitch, with clear rules to block money for influence. 

What this policy will do:  The Internet plays a much larger role in elections, and it is the easiest to regulate. The government establishes an election web page provided for free to all candidates. It shall have three tiers

  1. Established parties – parties that have been in Parliament in at least one of the past three terms
  2. Small or emerging parties – parties that can show a membership of 200 or more
  3. Individuals – persons who put their name forth to gain a platform

For tier 1 parties, a tax-funded budget shall be set for hoardings and tier 2 a smaller budget based on membership.

The same shall be provided for mailers and a fixed budget for professional video presentations, paid for and sent by the electoral commission. The videos are recommended to follow the 1-3-18 format, meaning 60 second commercials, 3 minute elevator pitch and the 18 minute TEDx talk with each candidate allowed ten of each set to address the top ten issues in their mind.

Volunteers may door knock and hand out the official mailers, but no other printed matter.  Volunteers may assist people in voter registration. Parties may call public meetings, with tier one and two funding for hall rental. Elected officials shall be prohibited from calling official meetings (ostensibly discharging their duties as MP’s) during election season unless specific dispensation is granted by the electoral commission.

No persons may pay for or provide electioneering material outside of the official process, except for advocacy on matters of policy that do not promote a particular party or candidate.

The right of reply to media editorials shall be accorded to any candidate, including Tier 3.


Platforms disallowed as mandates

 

Problem: During the election, political parties publish lengthy platforms read by very few, and then claim their planks as mandates when elected. This undermines democracy except for platform planks that had a high level of public debate.

Need: As part of election procedural reform, include in the law that platform planks are not mandates unless they had a high level of public debate. 

What this policy will do: By placing the intent in the law, mandate claims are delegitimised, and while a party in power may do whatever they want, they risk adverse blowback when they try.

Outlaw lobbying

 

Problem: Lobbying is the sale of influence. A person develops an inside track within a party, and then crosses over into a consultancy where they charge private persons to gain access to the elected and appointed officials. 

Need: People do need access to their elected and appointed officials. Officials need feedback including technical or complex information. Without it bad policy can be made. However this should not come with a price.

What this policy will do: Make lobbying illegal. Expand and fund the office of Ombudsman to include access specialists available to any and all persons. The specialists must be competent (and highly paid) so they can separate out the inappropriate applications from ones with merit. In most cases, merit means public benefit, but it also can mean improving the private sector so it is more competitive – thus indirectly benefiting the public. The specialists would not only evaluate, but would translate applications into the most effective form for an official or representative to digest and act upon. Essentially, the specialists become lobbyists paid by tax dollars. 

Public Impact Advocate

Corruption is pecuniary interest masked as public interest

When the rotting house crisis hit NZ, the government of the day knew they had to do something. Unfortunately, there were no MPs with much experience in the building industry, and the likewise the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment lacked expertise in construction. They turned to the very industry that had caused the crisis in the first place. While the media and pundits blamed “cowboys”, meaning small, independent contractors with a ute, dog and cellphone, facts showed the failure came from the big players who advocated untreated radiata pine, no-eve buildings and designs that allowed water in, but did not dry out before the wood started to rot and the building began to mould.

Those industries were represented by lobbyists in the form of trade associations, and they took advantage of the ignorance of elected officials and public services in MBIE to write rules that served their pecuniary interest at the expense of home buyers. It hit at every level, and created the affordable housing crisis.

Need for a Public Impact Advocate at the Table

When standards are written, the Committee should include a public-impact specialist, deeply knowledgeable in the particular industry, armed with the power of veto – meaning their role at the committee table is to say No, on behalf of the people who have to pay in time or money because of how the rule is written.

Every committee, department, agency and other government or quasi government agency should have an ex-officio advocate. These the powers must extend not only to when the rule is written, but after the fact, when the public encounters the barrier created by government and makes a formal complaint. Bad rules, complicated rules, rules that require consultants to negotiate simple processes, unfair rules, rules that demand significant delays and rules that can be rewritten to achieve the same outcome without red tape should all be fair game for the public impact advocate.

Independent Authority

The Authority should be funded with tax dollars, and each political party in Parliament shall appoint one representative to the Authority Board to serve four-year terms. The board’s charter should make clear it serves the people, not the politicians or the power structure, and its staffing should seek out well-informed specialists who understand their particular industry but are neither beholden to it, or have an insider’s relationship with it.

The authority should be empowered to actively solicit public feedback where government is seen as the problem not the solution. This includes local government and special entities. It should be granted the power of investigation, where claimed barriers of commercial sensitivity, confidential information or privacy have no standing.

The authority shall have negative authority only – to say no, to cancel. It may identify changes that would not attract a veto, but not impose them. It may however, take matters directly to Parliament with recommendations for new law. The authority should have the right to take personnel matters to the personnel’s senior management. In some cases, bad rules are promulgated by problematic public servants. They may need education, or in a personnel review, found unsuited for the office they hold, or unsuited to work in government. There needs to be a mechanism to identify such people and remove them from positions where they do not serve the public interest.

This practice is an inherent conflict of interest:

 We invite organisations that represent the views of a large – usually national – group with a common interest in the area being addressed by the standards solution to nominate a representative for the committee. We review nominations and select committee members from them.       Standards NZ

Yet Standards NZ seems oblivious because it is so normal in NZ. 

The Fox Guarding the Hen House – (cc) by John Cole, NC Newsline

Case Study: How standards are written

The above quote in the cartoon comes directly from Standards NZ web page on New Zealand standards development. There seems to be no awareness either of the inherent conflict of interest, nor any examination of the outcomes that create barriers to competition and substantially increase costs to ordinary Kiwis.

The policy of Standards NZ is to establish a committee made up of representatives of the trade organisations that advocate for the pecuniary interest of their members. This is a bit like inviting the foxes to design and build the chook house.

The outcome is Fortress NZ, where artificial barriers to overseas competition are erected. NZ’s population and geography is the size of the US state of Colorado,  thus companies that make far superior and more affordable products, due to their economies of scale and higher standards (especially in the EU) take one look at NZ and give it a pass – just what the committee members want.

Small scale entrepreneurs try to import better products – such as German made joinery, but the barriers prove insurmountable. BRANZ testing must be conducted and paid for before the small-scale importer can earn their first dollar. The local competition will pull every string they can – and there are many – to thwart the competition. The upshot is the affordable housing crisis. The losers are the struggling class. In the end, many middle-level earners give up and move to Australia.

The same game rigging has stifled the financial markets, where FMA rules tilt the playing field to the big banks and the sophisticated investors. Ditto the food industry, and soon the natural products industry. Even the classic car industry in NZ, that was world-renowned, has been killed by the draconian repair certifier rules.

GOVERNING:

The affordable housing crisis

Solutions:

For the entry level, mobile homes.

For volume production: MarketTowns

For government reform: Reform User Pays

The affordable housing crisis did not come about by accident. It came about by a perfect storm unintentionally created by government. It is simple to state, hard to fix.

Price:Income Ratio: When the median household price exceeds a 3:1 ratio with median household income, housing becomes unaffordable first for the poor, then at it heads toward 10:1 for the lower middle class as well as young adults,  uni graduates with too much debt, elderly who failed to build home equity (by renting or by divorce), older women, Māori, Pasifika and other disadvantaged groups. Eventually society polarises into the haves and the have nots.

The answer is to get the ratio back to 3:1. This means increasing the supply of homes causing the market to drop and aggressively examining every contributing factor that raises the cost of zoning, financing and constructing new homes.

Land Supply: For every new family (net) there needs to be one additional single-family home. When planning was done by civil engineers this happened. When universities started training environmental planners, environmental protection improved, but land supply contracted. Result, higher prices for subdivided land.

Consenting costs and time: Developers say more than half the job of subdivision is securing permission. The RMA does not enable people and communities, it is a cash cow for councils and private planners. Extensive reports do not protect the environment, but they do increase costs.

Requirements: Consenting requirements add to cost without demonstrable benefit. The councils have no checks and balances, so they place demands that developers must do… and pass on to the end customer, meaning higher land prices.

Development Contributions: In theory if a developer makes money and it costs the taxpayer to subsidise the developer profits, the developer should pay a contribution. But in practice, it has become a cash cow for councils and further increases land prices.

Revenue Conflict of Interest: At one time, consent fees were low because the benefit of resource consent compliance was deemed a matter of public interest. Now councils fund their consenting departments through revenue they collect, and senior management pressures staff to generate billings. This has been tested, and it is an abdication of the role of the public service.

Building Consent Liability: Since the leaking home debacle, councils are terrified of liability, thus they set out extreme documentation requirements to ensure they are not exposed. The costs of third party consultants is added to the cost of housing, further raising above the 3:1 ratio.

Lobbying by Pecuniary Interest: Architects, engineers, the Master Builders Association, the many trade associations representing building materials, components and services have successfully lobbied government for monopolistic protection. In the name of health and safety, the rules are designed to supress competition.

Fortress NZ: In a country the size of the US state of Colorado, MBIE has written a building code that requires compliance to NZ standards written by advisory committees comprising of representatives of trade associations. No surprise that this creates insurmountable barriers to competition. What overseas supplier that meets higher international standards will spend the money to secure BRANZ compliance for a market of 5 million people?

This is an essay. Grab a cuppa, settle in for a long read on a laptop or larger. It shows why housing is 10X income, not 3X.

AFFORDABLE HOUSING: How we got into this mess in the first place

The two-decade creation of the perfect storm to make housing unaffordable

Why is housing unaffordable? Bad law, bad regulation, ignorance, legal-corruption, greed & cronyism… a perfect storm 20 years in the making.

Problem

Why housing is unaffordable (a perfect storm)

From Civil Engineers to Environmental Planning grads

About 2o years ago, something happened in district councils. Older civil engineers who administered the RMA began to be forced out by a new generation of university graduates with degrees in environmental planning. Where the old guard focused on infrastructure to ensure greenfield expansion matched population growth, the new breed of planners had been taught to value the environment over rezoning for new housing. The result was predictable. The cost of zoned land rose.

https://www.waikato.ac.nz/study/campaigns/environmental-planning

This needs to be fixed. Universities need to rethink the curriculum. Yes, protecting the natural and physical environment is important, but either government has to set a zero-population-growth policy (unlikely) or it has to remove the bias against rezoning greenfield for growth. This can be done (see the post on MarketTowns), but it requires an overhaul of both the curriculum, and the fundamental bias of the faculty.

Then at a policy level, councils need to adopt resolutions that require planning accommodate population growth with a target median house price to median household income of 3:1. If the councils find this too hard, then resolve to ask Kainga Ora to use its powers under the Urban Development Act 2020 to identify and implement new towns.

How Councils are funded

Rates are supposed to fund projects and services the public needs but the private sector will not supply. But there is a limit to what the voting ratepayer can support, a limit lower than what council senior management feels it needs to support its offices, salaries, perks and actual services and long-term investment. User pays is an attractive alternative because it only impacts those trying to do something, such as develop a greenfield into a new tract of homes and shops.

But those costs are passed on to the end buyer; the family buying the home, the business person leasing a shop, office or restaurant. As a result, not only does the cost of the facility increase, but overall prices go up. The reason a cup of coffee costs $5 is not because the cafe is creaming it, but because the landlord keeps putting up the rent to recover the costs in the building, including fees and rates.

There is no way to politely say it. Councils have become greed machines. Senior management resembles budget airlines looking for ways to charge for everything, like 1 kg over weight bags or a window seat. Why? Because the planning and building departments are self-funded. User pays creates an inherent conflict of interest. It’s spiralled out of control.

This needs to be fixed. The basic principle of user pays needs to be limited to demands solely where the benefit falls to the developer. The need for affordable housing is a public benefit where the associated costs should be funded by the taxpayer on a national basis and the ratepayer on a council-jurisdiction level. This requires a law change.

How Building Materials are approved

Decades ago the building industry consisted of skilled tradies who knew how to construct buildings suitable for the NZ climate using proven building materials and methods. Consents were simple and low cost because they relied on an industry knowing what it was doing.

But then corporatism infused itself into the industry. Corporatism is big business hiring efficiency experts to find ways to cut costs to increase profits. Flat roofs and plaster cladding suitable for Mediterranean (read dry, low humidity, no driving rain) climates cost less to build. The industry convinced the government to permit untreated Radiata pine, a sapwood that rots easily, to be used for framing. The upshot was the leaky homes crisis, and the 5th Labour government, whose Minister of Housing was an academic, brought in the Building Act 2004 that caused building consents to skyrocket in price.

The Act required all building materials to be approved. To write the NZBC (NZ Building Code), committees were set up where MBIE invited representatives of trade association to write the drafts. No surprise that the trade associations promoted the pecuniary interest of their members by establishing de facto barriers to competition, both making it too expensive and arduous for superior offshore materials to gain approval for a market the size of the US state of Colorado, and for home-grown entrepreneurs seeking to challenge the established order.

This needs to be fixed. Competitive pricing for building materials is in the public interest, and the cost of approval should be paid by the public, and it should be expedited so approval takes weeks, or months at worst, not years. Overseas approvals should not require replication in NZ, but should be accepted unless it can be shown they clearly do not fit the NZ climate. The building material cartel should be regulated where anti-competitive practices are a crime not only subjecting the business to fines, but holding the responsible personnel criminally responsible.

Further, in establishing advisory committees to write the draft rules, the principles of Wisdom of Crowds (see here) should apply. If trade associations are represented (which does bring industry expertise), they should be offset by consumer representatives skilled in ensuring the proposed rules are solely in the public interest and do not use rules to favour the interests of the trades.

How Building Practitioners are Licensed

In the aftermath of the leaky homes crisis, the large corporates and trades blamed “cowboy builders” when in fact it was the large corporates and the mass-production trades using defective, but BRANZ approved products and building methods.  The Master Builders association lobbied for licensing, ostensibly to get rid of the cowboys. The upshot was a tripling of the cost of skilled construction labour.

Some builders quit because they had been attracted to the industry due to a learning disability – they could not read. They were experts at hand work, but could not pass the written tests brought in by the new regime. Others quit because it was all just too hard. Easier to take an indoor job in a building supply store. Those who stayed on logoed Licensed Building Practitioner (LBP) on their new utes, as they found their newly-state-sanctioned careers paid more than many white-collar jobs.

This is now resulting in a new approach to house making. Instead of bespoke construction on site, factory manufacturing that does not require LBPs is rising in popularity. Buildings are now assembled, not constructed, on site using factory-made components, such as FrameCad light-gauge steel panels, with further interest in modular design in which the rooms are made in factories and stacked on site like Lego blocks.

The LBP program needs to be fixed, but the pecuniary interest is so great it is unlikely elected officials will take it on. Instead, the building industry needs to move from the 18th century to the 21st. The whole approach to how the housing market works needs to be reinvented. Mass manufacture of buildings using Computer Assisted Design so they do not look bland or cookie-cutter is the answer. Leave the LBP approach to the bespoke construction industry of homes for the comfortable class who have no problem paying millions.

Solution

How to make housing affordable

Use the Urban Development Act 2020

In the 5th National Government, 2009-17, Building and Construction Minister Nick Smith proposed the Urban Development Act. It proposed to create an Urban Development Authority (UDA) that would bring all aspects of major development projects (matters of national interest) under one authority.

Land acquisition, rezoning, financing, building of infrastructure, building consents and construction that is otherwise a gauntlet of multiple consenting and consulting agencies to the point where over half the cost and effort of real estate development is securing permission

Unfortunately, when the 6th Labour Government took over in 2017, it rebranded the Urban Development Authority as Kainga Ora and turned its focus to state housing for beneficiaries of the welfare system. With the 6th National Government prepared to take power, it is time to revisit the Urban Development Act and use its powers as originally intended.

Don’t tinker with the market, create an alternative

Manipulating the housing market to lower the price to income ratio from 10:1 to 3:1 would be devastating for home owners who would be tipped into negative equity. Increasing median income to 1/3 median house price will not happen in a global economy.

Instead, create new housing markets that target the 3:1 ratio. This is detailed in the post on Market Towns, although it does not have to be limited to that scale or type of development. The UDA powers are the key:

  1. Buy the land at pre-zone pricing (probably rural)
  2. Do not take a capital gain on subdivision
  3. Do not pay the council a development contribution
  4. Infrastructure costs paid by the taxpayer not the council
  5. Set up a pop-up factory to manufacture the buildings
  6. Target total cost to be 3X the projected income of buyers
  7. Where possible cut the cost of living, such as no need for cars.

Under UDA development is in the national interest. This means taxpayer paid, not user pays. Don’t burden the council, but make the development a profit centre for them, meaning it will pay more in basic rates than it will require in council services.

At the entry level, support mobile/modular homes

As discussed in other posts (see here) the 6th Labour Government declared an informal but devastating war on poor people who were leasing and buying mobile homes from the fledgling Kiwi industry.

Some were individuals making one tiny home on wheels at a time. Others were factories turning out dozens per month. Because they were mobile, they were not captured by the perfect storm that made buildings unaffordable. They were small, inexpensive and provided warm, dry, safe and durable adequate housing for people whose alternative was hidden homelessness (living in cars, tents, sheds, garages and overcrowded conditions). Until, reportedly in a cabinet meeting, the elected officials agreed they did not want American style trailer home parks in NZ, which trickled down to MBIE, MFE and MSD as a declaration of war on mobile homes (factory made) and tiny homes on wheels (DIY made).

This needs to be fixed.

  • Youth: Mobile homes enable the young to get on the property ladder, especially if lease to purchase is an option where 5-7 years rent gains ownership – enough to sell for a downpayment on land and home.
  • Homeless: They provide a much better alternative than putting a family of four in a hotel room in Rotorua for months or years even.
  • Tangata whenua: For the whanau on ancestral whenua, they can be manufactured in two weeks and installed on site in two hours while avoiding the problems of bank financing on Māori title.
  • Urban Pasifika, etc: Especially in South Auckland, certain sectors have large families overcrowded in homes designed for the nuclear family of the 1950s’. Permit mobile homes to be parked next to the family home to take up the excess demand.
  • Elder/disabled: For the family with a vulnerable elder or disabled adult child, a mobile home can be parked next to the family property to provide a modicum of independence while enabling necessary supervision. When the elder dies, the home is removed
  • Flood, earthquake: In a civil defence emergency, immediate housing is essential. Having a reserve of mobile homes that can be deployed behind ordinary SUV towing to site in 24 hours provides responsive capacity. Rather than leave in a carpark unused, lease such units to major airports where they serve as first-arrival or last-departure accommodations so they are clean and ready when an emergency arises
  • Essential workers: In tourist destinations like Queenstown or Waiheke, essential workers are living in overcrowded conditions or in cars or tents. Using Kainga Ora, zone for essential worker camps using mobile homes. Most will be young and for them, this will be a party zone. Ensure it does not spawn cross-boundary conflict.
  • Cycle Trail accommodationLong distance cycle trails are becoming a major ecotourism option worldwide. NZ initiated its own version, but the tour operators must collect the riders at the end of the day and bus them to a nearby town. Instead authorise Kainga Ora to use its UDA authority to build mobile home campsites along the trails leased to cycle-tourism operators.

Local Government: Stop using consents as cash cows

This one is complicated by the fact the RMA was recently changed. However, the principles remain the same. User pays is being abused.

Resource Management Act 1991

 

18A Procedural principles: Every person exercising powers and performing functions under this Act must take all practicable steps to(a) use timely, efficient, consistent, and cost-effective processes that are proportionate to the functions or powers being performed or exercised;

 

Section 36AAA Criteria for fixing administrative charges

(1) When fixing charges under section 36, a local authority must have regard to the criteria set out in this section.

(2) The sole purpose of a charge is to recover the reasonable costs incurred by the local authority in respect of the activity to which the charge relates.

(3) A particular person or particular persons should be required to pay a charge only— (a) to the extent that the benefit of the local authority’s actions to which the charge relates is obtained by those persons as distinct from the community of the local authority as a whole;

 

The RMA has become an important part of funding

In 2022, Herald senior reporter Bernard Orsman wrote a story entitled: $270m budget hole: Aucklanders set for steep rates rises unless big savings found. In it he wrote: Falling revenue from things like resource consents as the economy heads south next year is also adding to the deficit.

If one reads RMA Section 36AAA(2), this is a breach of the law. If the sole purpose of RMA charges is to recover reasonable costs incurred by the local authority in respect of the activity to which the charge relates then falling resource consents should have a neutral impact on the budget. 


The only way for an ordinary citizen to learn how actual charges are calculated and charged is to submit an actual consent application and see what happens. The director of a charitable trust focused on affordable housing did this, and the findings were disturbing.

Case Study One: Affordable Elder Housing

On Waiheke Island, the Waiheke Community Housing Trust raised funds to purchase a section to build three affordable elder homes they would lease. The budget saw a 100% budget blowout, due to charges, delays and required consultant reports by the Council. The final straw was a demand for a development contribution. Six months after the project finally opened  the trust was forced to sell the property and evict the elderly tenants. Far from enabling the people and communities, Auckland Council disabled them, crushed them, destroyed them.

When Auckland Council was asked to explain how they reconciled their charges to a charitable trust in the context of S36AAA (3) the senior manager for Resource Consenting replied in writing that Auckland Council considers every application to benefit the applicant, even a charitable trust that is intentionally building affordable housing to benefit the community.  This raises two questions:

  1. Why would the Parliament in its wisdom include S36AAA(2) if the Council’s position is right?
  2. How does benefit fall to trustees who will not live in the housing? 

When the council was asked these questions, they stonewalled.

Case Study Two: Local food and turning waste materials into surplus resources

Having witnessed the Waiheke Housing Charitable Trust debacle, and finding council officers refused to meet with or answer questions in writing as to how the social and environmental challenges could be addressed, the council advised another charitable trust director the only way to engage is to file a resource consent application. Having done so, the outcome was disturbing:

  • No way to apply for a consent without paying a 4-figure deposit
  • No controls over how the planners charge against that deposit
  • The planner charged 333 minutes to reject the application and take it from the deposit
  • The applicant asked to appeal the charges and was denied in violation of the law
  • The required appeal report was not written by the council despite numerous requests
  • It is believed the rejection was in error, but the Council simply stonewalls
  • It is clear the culture within Council is to “run the meter” in breach of s18(a)

Need for Reform

The proposed Labour reforms of the RMA are not reforms at all, but instead are ways to increase parasitical costs in property development. Real changes would include:

  • S36AAA(2) enforced. Councils must show charges are fiscally neutral, not funding overhead
  • S36AAA(3) enforced. No charges to community-benefit initiatives such as housing trusts
  • S36AAA(3) enforced. No charges for a rejected application (does not benefit the applicant)
  • S18A(a) enforced. Council must demonstrate efficient and cost-effective charges

Overhaul: A major overhaul of the culture of council planning is necessary. Central government should make it clear consents are not to be a new source of revenue. Further, if the laws need to be untangled to make applications user-friendly (not needing a private planner), enact them. For example, ban negative components where the applicant is required to cite every rule. overlay and national policy and then state it either does not apply or the effects are de minimis. Simple applications should be able to be written by a reasonably literate, non-professional applicant, and the planners instructed to not reject for lack of jargon. If the application misses a point, the planner should have the latitude to add the point and make the approval conditional on the amendment.

Rebalance: The purpose of the RMA is to enable people and communities to provide for their social, economic and cultural well being, health and safety while protecting and preserving the environment. Rebalance the Act by drafting clear instructions to council that:

  • Enable people and communities, not officers and private planning consultants and experts
  • Make economic well-being equal to environment in assessment
  • Same for social and cultural well-being
  • Define environment in a way that includes human habit
  • Do not use applicant fees to fund studies (such as required applicant-paid surveys on lizards
  • For every net immigrant family require (using UDA) one new house to be constructed
  • Boost the role of the Urban Development Act in doing major development using skunkworks*

Beauty: Finally, add beauty and love-of-place to the purpose of the RMA. NZ is a young country with a transient outlook. As countries mature, people build towns and villages, workplaces and homes not only to keep them warm and dry, but to enable them, and their future generations to enjoy a good life. This is why old Europe is so beautiful and American-style suburbs are so banal.


* Skunkworks is where a large and unwieldy institution like Kainga Ora sets up a small, highly focused team – in this case, using company-law – assigned to accomplish a single outcome – in this case to build new towns. Do not use private developers because their pecuniary interest is not, and will never be, aligned with the public interest. Do not use the civil service because public servants are risk aversive, wasting time, money and burning out good ideas.

 

NATIONAL PLANNING STANDARDS DEFINITION 


The new definition of building in the National Planning Standards is flawed. It was specifically altered to target the lowest cost housing solution for the poor, especially tangata whenua on Māori-title land, and Pasifika peoples in South Auckland, as well as young people unable to get on the property ladder except through a DIY tiny home.

WHEN HOLLYWOOD BIAS BECOMES GOVERNMENT POLICY

Under the 6th Labour Government, a high level political authority reported that in an informal discussion by Cabinet, it was resolved that mobile homes/tiny homes would not to be a part of the Labour government’s response to homelessness. The politicians around the table felt “trailer parks” were seen to constitute a hot-potato that the Labour government did not want to be associated with.

Trailer-house trash is a Hollywood cliché: a run-down trailer home park full of low-life losers, petty criminals, drunks and addicts. In a cabinet meeting, it is an abdication of responsibility to address the growing number of hidden homeless – people living in cars, tents, garages and overcrowded conditions by dismissing a viable solution because it might be seen as a political hot potato.

This informal resolution then was quietly passed on to the respective ministries, including MBIE, MFE and MSD, among others, who then began an undeclared war on tiny homes and mobile homes. In addition to adverse determinations by MBIE asserting chattel housing were actually buildings (undermining the fundamental basis of a thousand years of property law), MFE created a new weapon to block the poor from affordable proper housing by conflating real property (realty) and personal property (chattel) in the new National Planning Standard Definition of the word building. Four words slipped into a 56 page document have the power of law without any scrutiny, any review by Parliament’s Legislative Design and Advisory Committee or the Regulatory Review Committee.

Adding four words to a documents called NPS-Definitions is sure to put everyone to sleep except policy wonks… until the local council enforcement officer knocks on the mobile home door of poor person to advise them they either have to spend $20,000 to get a resource consent, or remove the mobile home from the property (and return to hidden homelessness). By then, it’s too late.

Mobile homes cost under $100,000, are warm, dry, durable and comfortable, providing bedrooms, bathrooms, kitchens and lounge in a compact and efficient design, and they are a private-sector initiative responding to a dire need as the price of buildings became unaffordable due to onerous regulation and a limited supply of new residential zoning.

The losers will be the poor, the defenceless, the ones quite invisible to the nameless, faceless MFE bureaucrats who inserted the four words into NPS-Definitions. Why? Because defining mobile homes as buildings catches them in a regulatory swamp that will kill the industry and return the poor to cars, tents and overcrowded conditions.

HOW TO FIX IT

Use the same definition found in the Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga Act 2014:

building means a structure that is temporary or permanent, whether movable or not, and which is fixed to land and intended for occupation by any person, animal, machinery, or chattel.

And if deemed necessary add new definitions for

  • mobile home: manufactured chattel housing
  • tiny home on wheels: DIY chattel housing
  • chattel shelter: shelter not fixed to land, including homes, workplaces, storage or other use; temporary and long-term.
  • repurposed shipping container
  • skid shelter: manufactured chattel modules

Begin by clearly restating the fundamental principle of property law to distinguish between chattel (personal property or movables) not fixed to land, retaining its own independent identity,  and realty: land or that which is fixed to land  with the intention of permanent annexation, that has lost its independent identity and become part of the land and title to it.

HOW IT HAPPENED AND HOW TO PREVENT IT  


MFE Minister asleep at the wheel

The Government introduced National Planning Standards (NPS), which are lesser instruments of government called for in RMA section 58B. As secondary legislation, they do not require a vote in the House or to be approved by the Governor General by Order of Council (a vote of the Executive Council). According to Legislation Act 2019 s67(d) such secondary legislation does not automatically trigger drafting by the Parliamentary Council Office (PCO), and it appears the contentious language was not vetted by the PCO but written by the Ministry for the Environment (MFE) staff and presented to the ministers in Cabinet, in this case Hon David Parker (Labour) and Hon Eugenie Sage (Greens) for signature. 

Among the 22,000 words in the NPS standard terms are four words that should never have been handed to the Minister for signature, and on private enquiry, it was learned the Minister had no idea they were embedded in what should have been a standard, non-controversial document. To summarise, the following was embedded and is now law.

building means a temporary or permanent movable or immovable physical construction that is:
(a) partially or fully roofed; and
(b) fixed or located on or in land;
but excludes any motorised vehicle or other mode of transport that could be moved under its own power.  [emphasis added]


BACKGROUND BRIEF

Why did MFE do this?:

The earlier 234 page NPS background report  explains: 

…structures  that are located on land but not fixed to land on the basis that it is becoming more common for relocatable structures to be used that are not fixed to land. Shipping containers have been difficult  to manage under the RMA as it is their own weight that holds them down (they are not fixed to land)  and small mobile/relocatable buildings have become more common over recent times. 

This makes it clear the target is the increased use of both repurposed shipping containers and intentionally manufactured (or DIY) mobile homes and other relocatable chattel. Note the author calls them mobile buildings, which shows the writer lacks an understanding of the fundamentals of property law. There is no such thing as a mobile building.

All buildings are structures. All structures are realty. All realty is either land or that which is fixed to land and annexed to the title to the land.

If something is mobile, it is not fixed to land, and therefore by definition cannot be a building. It’s like calling a tree an animal.

Based on this concern MFE in its first draft proposed to redefine the words building and structure:

3.14.1 Proposed definition
 
Building means any structure, whether temporary or permanent, moveable or fixed, that is enclosed, with 2 or more walls and a roof, or any structure that is similarly enclosed
   
Structure means any building, equipment, device or other facility made by people and which is fixed to or located on land; and includes any raft, but excludes motorised vehicles that can be moved under their own power [underline added]

The problem with this is it is a breach of Legislation Act 2019, which says:

20. Words used in secondary legislation or other instruments have same meaning as in empowering legislation.

Structure is already a part of the RMA:

Structure means any building, equipment, device, or other facility made by people and which is fixed to land; and includes any raft”.

Given this reminder they were proposing to breach the Legislation Act, in their second try, the NPS authors moved the “or located on” language from structure to their new meaning for the word building, which is not defined in the RMA.

Because they could not use their original definition (Building means any structure…), MFE explains that they invented a new legal term, physical construction, explaining that it would embrace not only structures but what property law calls chattel – things made by people that is not fixed to land.

Two problems

  1. The word construction refers to realty (real property) not chattel, so MFE failed to hit the target. 
  2. To redefine such a fundamental word at law as building is not something done by inserting a few prepositions into a massive document and failing to inform the Minister that MFE just upended a thousand years of common law and property law.

In support of the first point, the clearest statement of meaning is found in US law, where US Federal Government Statutes says:

Construction means construction, alteration, or repair (including dredging, excavating, and painting) of buildings, structures, or other real property. For purposes of this definition, the terms “buildings, structures, or other real property” include, but are not limited to, improvements of all types, such as bridges, dams, plants, highways, parkways, streets, subways, tunnels, sewers, mains, power lines, cemeteries, pumping stations, railways, airport facilities, terminals, docks, piers, wharves, ways, lighthouses, buoys, jetties, breakwaters, levees, canals, and channels. Construction does not include the manufacture, production, furnishing, construction, alteration, repair, processing, or assembling of vessels, aircraft, or other kinds of personal property 

It is likely that if the NPS meaning of physical construction was tested in High Court, it would be limited to real property and not include personal property (chattel) that is not fixed to land. Although it is more likely the court would toss the definition out entirely and instruct MFE to try again or to use the standard meaning, as best found in Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga Act 2014:

building means a structure that is temporary or permanent, whether movable or not, and which is fixed to land and intended for occupation by any person, animal, machinery, or chattel.
 
structure— (a) means a thing made by people, whether movable or not, and fixed to the land; and (b) includes equipment or machinery

WHAT WAS MFE THINKING?

MFE clearly set out its thinking in the consultation documents prepared by MFE.

In this publication: April 2019 Ministry for the Environment publication (ME 1404) 2I Definitions Standard – Recommendations on Submissions Report for the first set of National Planning Standards, MFE wrote:

RMA plans seek to manage effects from buildings in the main where those effects are more long term than from, for example, a car parked on a section and used every day. However, where those vehicles no longer move (likely no longer used for transportation but for activities such as business, storage or accommodation) we consider they would have similar effects as buildings and should be captured by the definition. We therefore recommend excluding motorised vehicles or any other mode of transport that could be moved under its own power.

This is clear evidence the authors have no understanding of the fundamental difference between chattel and realty. A motorised vehicle does not become realty because it is used for such activities as business, storage or accommodation rather than transport. While they may have similar effects as buildings (although a building must meet a 50-year performance standard and tends to permanently alter the landscape), they should not be captured by the definition. Excluding modes of transport that can be moved under its own power is the wrong distinction, and has become a labyrinth of bureaucratic torture because the author appears oblivious to the foundation of property law.

MFE then continues…

We considered the alternative to exclude vehicles where they are used for business, storage or residential activity – but given the fact that the definition applies to facilities that are located on land – the definition would then have encompassed any business vehicles or even trucks when located or parked on land. We consider it is more certain to only exclude those vehicles that can be moved under their own power. 

The introduction of the test “are located on land”, as opposed to fixed to land, annexed to title and having lost their independent identity is the point MFE lost the plot.

EVEN SO, IT FAILS

The supporting narrative published by MFE shows the lack of proper legal training as they struggle to force chattel into the realty box. They would have preferred to use the word “structure” except the law clearly sets out that this limits the reach of the definition to that which is fixed to land. They write:

As referred to above, the removal of the word “structure” from the definition of building, decouples a building from the requirement to be fixed to land which is specified in the RMA definition of “structure”. 

So MFE invents a new term: “physical construction”:

We considered other terms which could be applied instead of ‘physical construction’. We tested the word ‘facility’ with our pilot councils and they queried the meaning and certainty of that word. They sought clarity about whether some items such as shipping containers, caravans, motorhomes or house trucks would come within the meaning of the term. We consider that part of the uncertainty about that word relates to the fact that ‘facility’ may bear the meaning of a larger building or complex often used for a public or community purpose (eg, educational facility or community
facility). We consider that the term ‘physical construction’ carries the meaning of a structure that is manmade and tangible, but it does not need to be fixed to land. While this is a new term, we consider that it is broad enough to cover all types of buildings without setting any parameters other than that there must have been some form of manmade construction. It will not be taken to exclude some items because they don’t qualify; as the word ‘facility’ may have been.

The word “construction” refers to the making of improvements (buildings and structures) on realty (real estate or real property). One does not construct a car, one manufactures it. One does not construct a mobile home or caravan, one manufactures it, if in a factory, or one makes it, if DIY. Therefore, it can be argued in High Court that “physical construction” is limited to realty, thus does not extend MFE’s invented new meaning of building to encompass its target.

Middle Level public servants working in a government ministry do not have the authority to decouple such fundamental words in law as building and structure. But they seem to be sufficiently ignorant of this limit on their authority that they made radical changes to property law and secured sign off from the respective ministers who were not alerted to the change.

The Problem with Writing Standards

New legislation has the benefit of vetting by the Legislative Design and Advisory Committee (LDAC) or the Parliamentary Council Office (PCO) that examines drafts to ensure they are consistent and understood by ordinary people.  Referencing Legislation Guidelines the 2021 edition, CHAPTER 14 Delegating law-making powers, Part 1: Is the matter appropriate for secondary legislation?, makes it clear when regulations become ultra vires. In particular:

The following matters should generally (or in some cases always) be addressed in primary legislation:… 
– variations to the common law. 

Redefining the meaning of building to include chattel (personal property) is a fundamental variation to the common law and one most unlikely to pass vetting by LDAC or PCO.

BREACH OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1993

The Human Rights Act 1993 part 21(1) requires any legislation or regulation be tested against it to ensure it does not contain prohibited grounds for discrimination. It can be easily shown that mobile homes are primarily an affordable option for classes of people overly represented in s21(1) including

  • Solo mums §s21(1)(b)(v) and §s21(1)(l)(i)
  • Māori and Pasifika, §s21(1)(f)
  • Disabled persons §s21(1)(h)
  • Elderly §s21(1)(i)
  • Unemployed §s21(1)(k)

The vast majority of persons living in chattel housing come from these disadvantaged classes. Redefining chattel housing as buildings means they must come under the compliance regulations of the Building Act 2004 as well as the RMA. The extra costs and delays required to meet the standards for buildings (which in many cases means suboptimal design compromises solely to meet standards inappropriate for mobile homes) prices those homes out of reach of the poor. 

Conclusion

The conflating of chattel and realty fundamentally alters the common law, and is likely to be found to be ultra vires – that a Minister signing off a standard that changes the common law to an opposite meaning exceeds his powers as delegated in Section 58B of the RMA.

A standard definition of building should be used – as best found in Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga Act 2014.

If there needs to be new definitions for chattel used as shelter, as abodes and other purposes, they should have new, but familiar terms. And for clarity, fixed to land should include clear tests that respect case law and common law.

APPENDIX: National Planning Standards Definition

https://environment.govt.nz/publications/2i-definitions-standard-recommendations-on-submissions-report-for-the-first-set-of-national-planning-standards/

See Page 50

3.14.3 Analysis and recommendations

Relationship between the definitions of structure and building

The original definition of structure in the draft planning standards was included to capture structures that are located on land but not fixed to land on the basis that it is becoming more common for relocatable structures to be used that are not fixed to land. Shipping containers have been difficult to manage under the RMA as it is their own weight that holds them down (they are not fixed to land) and small mobile/relocatable buildings have become more common over recent times.

The majority of submitters were opposed the definition of structure and requested that the RMA version from section 2 of the Act should apply. We accept that there could be unintended consequences and difficulties with the draft version of the structure definition. We therefore recommend that the RMA version be included instead. For ease of reference the RMA definition of structure is as follows:

structure means any building, equipment, device, or other facility made by people and which is fixed to land; and includes any raft”.

As a result of the adoption of the RMA definition of structure in the Standards it is considered necessary to remove the link to structure in the definition of building, to enable moveable or relocatable ‘buildings’ that do not need to be fixed to land to be captured by the definition. Instead, we recommend the definition include a requirement to be “fixed to or located on or in land”. This will enable both shipping containers and relocateable homes to be included – but still retains a land based requirement. By land, we confirm this has the meaning in the RMA (and in the Standards) which includes land covered by water. Therefore where the definition of building refers to being fixed to or located on land, this also applies to any buildings fixed to land covered by water.

Contrary to those submissions that requested only one combined definition of structure and building, we consider it is useful to have separate definitions. This gives councils the ability to address either or both as required. In addition, regional councils are more likely to need to address structures separately from buildings and so the separate definitions allow for this. Feedback from a regional council pilot council requested that the definition of structure remain so that structures in the coastal marine area could be addressed.

In addition, as a result of removal of the reference to structure in the building definition many of the exclusions that are often included in council plan definitions of buildings (such as retaining walls less than 1.5m high) do not need to be excluded in the recommended building definition; they are not captured by the term.

Submitters identified that the two terms are circular in that each refers to the other as ‘building’ was part of the structure definition and ‘structure’ was part of the building definition. We agree that this is poor drafting and the removal of the interdependency has resolved this issue.

We recommend replacing the word ‘structure’ in the ‘building’ definition with the words ‘physical construction’. The two definitions work together now so that that any building that is fixed to land would be captured by the term structure but not all buildings may be structures through the recommended use of the term ‘physical construction’ rather than ‘structure’ in the definition of ‘building’. We considered other terms which could be applied instead of ‘physical construction’. We tested the word ‘facility’ with our pilot councils and they queried the meaning and certainty of that word. They sought clarity about whether some items such as shipping containers, caravans, motorhomes or house trucks would come within the meaning of the term. We consider that part of the uncertainty about that word relates to the fact that ‘facility’ may bear the meaning of a larger building or complex often used for a public or community purpose (eg, educational facility or community facility). We consider that the term ‘physical construction’ carries the meaning of a structure that is manmade and tangible, but it does not need to be fixed to land. While this is a new term, we consider that it is broad enough to cover all types of buildings without setting any parameters other than that there must have been some form of manmade construction. It will not be taken to exclude some items because they don’t qualify; as the word ‘facility’ may have been.

As referred to above, the removal of the word “structure” from the definition of building, decouples a building from the requirement to be fixed to land which is specified in the RMA definition of “structure”. This would result in vehicles being captured by the definition if no additional changes were recommended. The submission from Christchurch City Council raised this as an issue. We do not consider that in the common use of the term “building”, vehicles would be considered to be included. We consider that vehicles (or other transport modes like railway carriages or boats) that come and go and are used for transportation should not be covered by this definition. We note that the Building Act 2004 includes in its definition only those vehicles that are “immovable” and “occupied by people on a permanent or long‐term basis”.

RMA plans seek to manage effects from buildings in the main where those effects are more long term than from, for example, a car parked on a section and used every day. However, where those vehicles no longer move (likely no longer used for transportation but for activities such as business, storage or accommodation) we consider they would have similar effects as buildings and should be captured by the definition. We therefore recommend excluding motorised vehicles or any other mode of transport that could be moved under its own power. We considered the alternative to exclude vehicles where they are used for business, storage or residential activity – but given the fact that the definition applies to facilities that are located on land – the definition would then have encompassed any business vehicles or even trucks when located or parked on land. We consider it is more certain to only exclude those vehicles that can be moved under their own power.

We acknowledge that there are other items that are moveable and have a roof and so could meet the recommended definition of a building. In particular, tents, caravans, and marquees would be included. We acknowledge that the definition of building is broadly crafted and councils will need to use subcategories or narrower application definitions and rules to manage or permit these items where required.

Certainty – and what constitutes a wall or a roof or similarly enclosed?

Submitters identified that in some buildings (for example aircraft hangers and Nissen huts) walls are not clearly identifiable and their identification can be debated. Circular buildings may only have one ‘wall’ and with a dome roof this may not even be clear such as in the example below:

 

Source: http://www.cosyhomes.net.nz/product/dome‐house/

To avoid the problem of having to clearly identify the walls in the type of dome house example above the phase “or similarly enclosed” was included in the draft standard. This phase was opposed by submitters on the basis that it does not provide enough certainty. As a result the recommended definition has included the phase “is partially or fully roofed”. Consideration was given to excluding any permeable roof on the basis that this then would exclude crop protection structures from the definition. However, it was considered that any exclusion for a permeable roof could result in a loophole in the definition. Is a roof that leaks a permeable roof? How impermeable would it need to be to qualify? This could make it difficult for compliance and enforcement purposes. We consider that it would be better for the plan provisions (rather than the building definition) to clearly enable crop protection structures or other similar structures if this is the desired outcome.

Relationship with the Building Act 2004 definition of building

Some submissions suggested using the definition of building from the Building Act 2004. This was considered in the draft standard but discounted on the basis that the definition in the Building Act serves a different purpose to any RMA definition of building. We agree with this. We did consider including the phrase from the Building Act definition of building “intended for occupation by people, animals, machinery, or chattels’. However, we discounted this because from an RMA effects point of view what a building is used for or whether it is empty or occupied is not relevant. Therefore we do not recommend the inclusion of such a reference.

Relationship with definitions in other acts

Environment Southland queried the relationship with the definition of building in the Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga Act 2014. That definition applies to heritage buildings within that Act and the definition in the planning standards applies to RMA plans. Where RMA plans address heritage buildings they may use a subcategory definition where required.

Broadness of the definition and inclusions and exclusions or size exemptions required

A number of submitters sought the exclusions of buildings up to a certain size (and not always the same size). This can be addressed though rules that permit small buildings (eg, any building that does not exceed 10m2 in area or 2m in height can be permitted). We consider that this approach will make plans easier to understand and use. Any related bulk and location rules could also be drafted to exempt small buildings from having to comply with things like setback requirements or building coverage calculations.

Other submissions sought clarification about what is included within the definition and many items were referred to. We consider that these can be addressed in rules where required. We acknowledge that will require many rules but we consider that the broadness of the definition is inherent in the meaning of building and where councils need to address specific types of buildings or even parts of buildings such as decks, it is clearer for users if this is located in rules rather than hidden in a definition. On the issue of decks, if free standing and without a roof, they may be addressed within the definition of “structure”.

Implications for plans of changes

In relation to amendments to rules that may be required, we acknowledge the extent of these and in consideration of that issue we have provided extended timeframes for implementation to allow councils to implement changes within plan reviews, if desired.

Additional points

In relation to the issue of whether a building is above or below ground, we recommend adding the phrase “fixed to or located on or in land” and this ensures that the definition does not differentiate between the two. Some buildings may be below ground and if councils wish to address these they may do so within their rules.

In summary, we recommend the definition of structure is replaced with the definition of structure from section 2 of the RMA. We also recommend the definition of building is replaced with the following definition:

Building means any a temporary or permanent movable or immovable physical construction that is‐

(a) partially or fully roofed, and

(b) is fixed to or located on or in land, but

(c) excludes any motorised vehicle or other mode of transport that could be moved under its own power.

Need to reform Local Government 

The Funding Mechanism for Local Government creates a conflict of interest

When pecuniary interest eclipses public interest in the culture of local government the institution fails in the purpose for which it was created

A recent headline in Business Desk read Builders say consents system is ‘broken’ . It is. It’s not just the Building Control Authorities (BCA), the council department that provides building consents. What is called council planning, the group that issues resource consents has become a self-funded bureaucracy that operates as an unaccountable monopoly.

And, in large councils, most notably Auckland, fines have become a revenue source: one 160 meter bus lane in Newmarket generates $12,000 fines a day.  Of course council officials replied: “…although AT had been clear bus lanes weren’t aimed at revenue gathering…” but then goes on to say “revenue from fines helped fund public transport, parking, road safety campaigns, walking and cycling initiatives and road maintenance… With Auckland Transport utilising the enforcement revenues collected in this way council is also able to allocate funding Auckland Transport would have otherwise needed, to other council services like libraries, parks, community centres, the Art Gallery, the Zoo, and other recreational facilities.” That sure sounds like revenue gathering, despite the prior disclaimer. And staying with Auckland Transport for a moment, during the COVID crisis, $863,170 of taxpayer and ratepayer money was spent altering lower Queen Street that was ripped out a year later. If that has been a private sector stunt, heads would have rolled.

The problem? Local government is no longer local. It is government by unelected officers, team leaders and senior managers who use standing orders, privacy and commercial sensitivity to erect barriers between their decision-making and the public they ostensibly serve. They are not held accountable for their spending, for their policies, for their revenue collection or their failures. Checks and balances including the role of the elected councillors and that of public consultation have been neutered. The bigger the local government, the worse the problems.

The problems are systemic. It’s not that bad people are running local government, it is the natural outcome of a closed system. Systemic changes are needed:


Remove pecuniary interest

 

Problem: The funding mechanisms for local government finds senior management passes the message down to operational staff that revenue generation by fees, fines, contributions and hourly billings are a council priority. Indeed some departments such as building control authority and resource consent departments are told they are self-funded – you want your budget funded? Go get the money.  This distorts the purpose of local government and contributes to adverse outcomes, such as the affordable housing crisis.

Solution: All fees, fines, contributions and other charges levied by the territorial authority are paid into a central trust fund. Each territorial authority then applies for a share of that trust fund as revenue sharing. The trustees of the Trust Fund will provide a base rate based on population adjusted by local cost of living, with a remainder paid as an incentive bonus based on success criteria. For example, coming in under budget and under schedule on a road project would earn a bonus. Fixing a road so it lasts longer would earn a bonus. The fastest turnarounds in building and resource consents would earn a bonus.

In some cases, the bonuses should not be awarded to the authority, but to the personnel who delivered success… this means the managers and staff directly responsible for the accomplishment.


Remove joint and several liability

 

Problem: The joint and several liability principle applied to the leaky building crisis completely changed local government culture from public service to risk control.

Solution:  Local government is established by Central Government. The buck stops at the top. All fiscal liability should be held by the State. But personal liability should remain with the individual not the legal fiction of a limited liability company. In other words, staying with the leaking building crisis, the State should have immediately stepped in – similar to how it does with ACC – and paid to stop the leaks before there is further damage, and with no money wasted on endless court battles. Then it should investigate who is responsible with no protection of limited liability where the culprit simply puts their company into liquation, in a take the money and run scenario.

The power of the State to deprive persons of liberty or property should not be broken by limited liability companies. If a company is liable, the money cannot escape to the investors, owners, directors, family trusts, etc. The natural persons can be held liable if they do not repay their takings with the only out being personal bankruptcy. In other words, instead of holding the tax and ratepayers joint and severally liable, pierce the corporate veil and hold the culpable individuals liable. And if that liability extends to council personnel, they too should be held personally liable, but only if it is clear they failed to do their job.


Require councils to obey the law

 

Problem: Example: RMA Section 36AAA sets out the basis on which councils can charge applicants fees.  The benefit must fall to the applicant as opposed to benefiting the community as a whole. This is ignored by council. For example, charitable trusts apply for consent to build pensioner housing. The benefit is to the community that otherwise finds its pensioners become hidden homeless. But the council charges are not only assessed, but in some cases become so onerous, both in donations the trust has to raise, and the years it can take its volunteers to prevail, that the trusts abandon the projects and sell the land to developers for comfortable-class housing. 

Solution: Require councils to obey the law. In particular, have a tick-box on the online application that takes the applicant to a Section 36AAA payment section where they can signal the application is a community-benefit application and not subject to fees. These flagged applications are then reviewed by a council official to confirm the claim and then processed without fees charged.


Restore checks and balances

 

Problem: Elected officials stand for office promising change, but when they are sworn in, they discover their powers are limited. They are provided reams of briefing papers by the Chief Executive’s staff who shape the debate in a form pre-decided by the administrative staff. The elected representatives are dependent on the executive for information and those who buck the system find they are cut off.

Solution: Assign an independent staff to each elected mayor whose job is constituent services. Complaints, concerns and queries by the citizens of each ward are directed to these constituency services advocates (CSA) who have full right of enquiry and direct access to every council staff member and consultant – not filtered through the chief executive or PR staff. Findings are reported to the mayor, but also to the ward councillor, as the CSA reports to both. Where possible, the outcomes are documented on a public web site controlled by the mayor and ward councillors, not the chief executive and their staff.


Dial back Health & Safety

 

Problem: Health and safety have become excuses for disproportionate regulation that punish the law abiding and safe in an ineffective attempt to change the behaviour of law breakers and the irresponsible. For example, lowering the speed limit to 30 km/h on a road engineered for safe driving at 50 km/h is unlikely to cause a hoon driving at 80 to slow down, but it will frustrate the safe drivers who find the new limit below the intuitive safe speed. It will however, become a new source of council revenue for speeding tickets, and foster increased resentment of local government. 

Solution: Provide a disputes tribunal chaired by ward councillors and the mayor’s CSA staff (see above) that may hear any complaint of a regulation based on health and/or safety that the complainant views as unreasonable or lacking effectiveness. Empower the tribunal to order the respective administrative staff to change or revoke the regulation (following due process of law that may require a further council resolution) to fix it.


Dial back on Commercial Sensitivity

 

Problem: Commercial sensitivity is used as a cover to avoid accountability, especially involving waste of ratepayers money. It’s public money being spent, any ratepayer or citizen should be able to see where it is going, and if it is value for money. Vendors doing business with council will complain, but they will get used to it, and the public will benefit as open information means more competitive services.

Solution: Place the entire accounting system, including all contracts on line, made available by password to any person on the voting role. This includes job titles, but not person’s names. It includes company names. For the few cases that truly do require redaction due to commercial sensitivity (or personal security), the applicant must demonstrate to a committee of the council (elected officials) why redaction should be provided.

TE TIRITI O WAITANGI: An extraterritorial treaty

This brief promises to be controversial – please approach it with an open mind

This brief focuses solely on the Te Reo version of the treaty – the one the rangatira understood and signed.

Few have read Te Tiriti o Waitangi with an open mind and no preformed opinions. This is because it is written in Te Reo Māori thus immediately filters its readers to those who either learned Te Reo as a child, or chose to learn it as a student or adult.

Te Tiriti is surrounded by an extensive body of interpretation which is rather remarkable given that it consists of 480 words. 

Extraterritorial Treaty: It is claimed  Te Tiriti is a partnership, but there is no language in the 480 words that says this. But, for anyone trained in Western constitutional history and international law, Te Tiriti is a clear and unequivocal statement of extraterritoriality. In the clearest of language, the principles of extraterritoriality can be read word-for-word in Te Tiriti.

Extraterritoriality, usually as the result of negotiations between equal partners, identifies land within the sovereign’s realm that is exempt from the jurisdiction of national law. Examples of this include the Vatican surrounded by Italy, the United Nations in New York, and with different terms, the Native American tribes who signed treaties with the US government. The principle of extraterritoriality was well established within Law of States under which Europeans divided up the world when Te Tiriti was signed. While Te Tiriti is written in Te Reo, the principles are solidly based in European Law of States.

Te Tiriti clearly says the tribes and their leaders will accept national law (kāwanatanga) provided their local jurisdictions are exempt; that on a local level they govern by rangatiratanga, which as far as the Crown was concerned means the Crown does not extend its jurisdiction to the lands, villages and treasures of hapū and their rangatira. 

This is not recited as a historic curiosity. Instead it suggests a very different way in which Te Tiriti can be exceptionally relevant to the 21st century challenges facing both New Zealand and Aotearoa. In short, this solution proposes the Crown honour the words clearly written in Te Reo and in doing so restore nga kāinga, enable hapū to rebuild both mana and taonga katoa, and enable hapū to create a good life on their terms.

SOVERIGNTY: At the COP28 conference in Dubai, King Charles said The Earth does not belong to us, we belong to the Earth’.  In that statement, he clearly set out the difference between sovereignty and the Māori view of property. What makes this significant is, in law, under sovereignty King Charles, in the person of the Crown, owns 1/6th of the planet. As King of the realm, including the realm of New Zealand, the Crown holds absolute ownership of every square metre of land and then issues “title”, a bundle of rights that people believe grants ownership – including Māori title.

 

KAWANATANGA: In Te Ao Māori, people do not own land, the land is a living being, the mother of the people. This is akin to what King Charles was saying at COP28 “we belong to the Earth”.

In Te Tiriti, it simply means that while the hapū will manage their own affairs, they agree to national law.

UNDERSTANDING SOVERIGNTY: In 1066 William the Conqueror defeated the Anglo-Saxons, claiming all lands and attachments as his own. He held absolute ownership of all England, granting a bundle of rights called realty that established Crown sovereignty. As the British Empire expanded, sovereignty was claimed by war, purchase, treaty or occupation, but the basic principle of absolute ownership underlying ownership of real property (land) has not changed in Western Law. Thus, to establish sovereignty over “Nu Tirani”, the Crown signed a treaty with the native leaders. But to secure that sovereignty, the Crown had to agree to extraterritoriality on hapū whenua..

Sovereignty is Centralism

UNDERSTANDING EXTRATERRITORIALITY: In the “Law of States” under which Europeans divided up the world, at the time Te Tiriti was signed, the principle of extraterritoriality was well established. It identifies territory within the sovereign’s realm that is exempt from the jurisdiction of national law, usually as the result of negotiations between equal partners. For anyone who can read Te Tiriti o Waitangi in Te Reo, it is the clearest statement of an extraterritorial treaty one could imagine. The Rangatira agree to kāwanatanga on a national basis, but not on their lands. On their whenua, rangatira and hapū reserved tino rangatiratanga.

Extraterritoriality is Localism.


WHAT THIS MEANS:

As NZ seeks to make reparations for the abuses of previous generations, an understanding of Te Tiriti as extraterritorial offers an opportunity to enable Māori to restore the mana, the taonga and the tūrangawaewae lost in the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries.

  • In the 19th century, the Crown used war and confiscation to destroy the kāinga
  • In the 20th century, the Crown used Urbanisation to entice the young to leave the kāinga
  • In the 21st century, the Crown bribes a Māori elite as a new twist on neo-colonialism

Imagine instead that the Crown came clean, and declared it would honour the extraterritorial status of hapū whenua, kainga and taonga katoa. This would require major rebuilding in the provinces where most of the neglected or abandoned whenua lies fallow. In this web site, see the post REBUILD KAINGA for how it can be done.

 THE HISTORIC CONTEXT SUPPORTING THIS UNDERSTANDING

Tangata Māori were organised into tribal authorities and as such did not have a single nation in the 19th century meaning. Each tribe was akin to an Anglo-Saxon kingdom, with clearly defined boundaries to their land, within which they had a system of government that worked. Most notably, their system of land ownership was not the same as the Crown’s sovereignty, the legal basis of land law which continues in NZ to this day… that of absolute ownership. 

Sovereign ownership of all land: The fact that only the Crown can be the absolute owner of land is the basis of sovereignty. It is the foundational concept of English and New Zealand law. Known as the doctrine of tenure, the Crown is the ultimate owner of all land. All land is held by the citizen as tenant under a grant from the Crown. What is popularly thought of as owning land is legally being seized of a freehold estate in fee simple in the land, which must be derived from a grant by the Crown.

This concept would have been a drop-dead if presented to the rangatira present at Waitangi. Thus Te Tiriti included an extraterritorial clause in the Te Reo version. It is clearly written in simple and unambiguous words. The chiefs will accept kāwanatanga to introduce national law, provided their own local jurisdictions are exempt. They agreed to this because their need for land changed with the arrival of the colonists.

Colonialism brought benefits, enabling them to shift from a hunting & gathering economy which needed large tracts of land, to a farm-based economy needing less land, but needing money to buy the advances the English offered.  Colonialism brought technology that changed the needs of the tribes. Tools, seed and livestock meant they needed less land to feed themselves, and they were prepared to sell surplus land for barter or money to buy such technology. But the rangatira wanted a formal system of exchange to prevent opportunistic Māori from selling land over which they did not hold mana. Te Tiriti contained a protocol for formal sale of surplus land.

In addition, colonialism brought firearms, making utu more lethal. The tribes needed intertribal keepers of the peace – the British Army and civil police – and were prepared to accept kāwanatanga to enforce peace among the tribes as well outlaw conflict with the migrants. 

 


WHAT THIS DOES NOT MEAN: 

Mana whenua as extending property rights over fee simple (freehold) title is a fiction insofar as it is said to arise from Te Tiriti. In other words, the idea that in selling land under the protocol established by Te Tiriti, somehow certain rights over it remained, is an artificial construct that in a Machiavellian way continues what might be called neo-colonialism.

In neo-colonialism, the Crown elevates iwi over hapū, whereas in 1840, iwi was an identity (which waka your ancestors sailed on), not a collective governance body. But when one seeks to co-opt, the fewer cats on seeks to herd the better. Thus, by elevating iwi, and defining the Māori as partners (meaning their legitimacy is confirmed by the Crown, rather than in their own right), and by offering the baubles of office, the Crown is able to avoid its duty to extraterritorial exemption of hapū over their lands, villages and treasures. As has become part of the 21st century debate, the Crown has created a Māori elite in classic divide and conquer.

Having said that, under sovereignty the Crown can do whatever it wants. Because it holds absolute ownership of all land in NZ, if it choses to give rights to any class of persons, it has the power to do so. But to claim it derives that authority from Te Tiriti is a fiction, and it also results in continued poverty and deprivation among the rural Māori who still live on their ancestral lands. 

 

How Did This Come About? Regulatory Creep…


Regulatory creep is where government officials within a bubble that includes academics and persons with a vested interest enter into a conversation that begins with a kernel of fact, but then is embellished. New embellishments grow on top of the first, and over time a narrative evolves that has no foundation in reality or fact.

The term mana whenua is a tool of regulatory creep. In 2010, Victoria University Senior Lecturer in Law, Catherine Iorns Magallanes wrote The use of tangata whenua and mana whenua in New Zealand legislation  in which she set out how the term mana whenua emerged out of colonisation. It is worth reading to appreciate how regulatory creep happens.

Clive Barlow, in Tikanga Whakaaro, 1991 wrote: Mana Whenua: This is the power associated with the possession of lands. Possession is a clear concept, no different in Tikanga Māori than in English law. If a hapū no longer wishes to retain mana over whenua, it has protocols to withdraw. For example, in 1897, Neho Keepa, a rangatira of Ngati Paoa testified before the Native Land Court “All the earlier tupapaku (dead bodies) were removed to Wharekawa [the Miranda Coast]… on account of the uncertainty as to whether this land [Matiatia] would be sold or not. Tarakawa removed them, all the people know that there are no bones left in the old urupa.” 

During the gestation stage, the fiction of mana whenua is contained within its bubble. It is only when that bubble starts implementing change based on its fabricated story that pushback begins. This happened when the legislation for the Auckland Supercity was amended in 2010. It included regulatory creep in regard to mana whenua, granting involvement of mana whenua, and “mataawaka” (Māori living in the Auckland region who are not in a Mana Whenua group) in decisions over land outside of the extraterritorial jurisdictions of hapū.

The Act did not directly define the term, but established the concept of mana whenua groups:

Local Government (Auckland Council) Act 2009 

Part 7 (81) This Part establishes a board whose purpose is to assist the Auckland Council to make decisions, perform functions, and exercise powers by—
(a) promoting cultural, economic, environmental, and social issues of significance
for— (i) mana whenua groups; and (ii) mataawaka of Tamaki Makaurau; and
(b) ensuring that the Council acts in accordance with statutory provisions referring to the Treaty of Waitangi. 

Part 4 Interpretation (1) mana whenua group means an iwi or hapu that— (a) exercises historical and continuing mana whenua in an area wholly or partly located in Auckland; is 1 or more of the following in Auckland:
(i) a mandated iwi organisation under the Maori Fisheries Act 2004:
(ii) a body that has been the subject of a settlement of Treaty of Waitangi claims:
(iii) a body that has been confirmed by the Crown as holding a mandate for the purposes of negotiating Treaty of Waitangi claims and that is currently negotiating with the Crown over the claims

This is regulatory creep and neo-colonialism. Where mana whenua meant clear physical boundaries over which rangatira held tino rangatiratanga, the Local Government (Auckland Council) Act extends this to cover freehold title land sold by their respective hapū under the terms of Te Tiriti (or lost due to breaches of Te Tiriti, which is another subject and is the purpose of the Waitangi Tribunal.

The Crown holds sovereign authority to make any law, and in the absence of a written Constitution limiting its powers, it can do what it wants, including granting mana whenua as some sort of right over freehold title. But to say this comes from the words in Te Tiriti o Waitangi is a fiction.

GOVERNING. NZ..... To rule is easy, to govern difficult